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AUTOPSY OF A PLAIN ENGLISH INSURANCE CONTRACT:
CAN PLAIN ENGLISH SURVIVE PROXIMATE CAUSE?-
Graham v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d
1077(1983)
In Graham v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co. (PEMCO),I several
owners of homes destroyed by mudflows and water in the aftermath of the
May 18, 1980, eruption of Mount St. Helens sought recovery under their
plain English 2 homeowner's "all-risk" 3 policies. The question presented
on appeal was whether the "earth movement" exclusion from coverage
in those policies encompassed mudflows resulting from volcanic erup-
tion. The court found that earth movement was not "specifically de-
fined" 4 in the plain English policies. Rather than using traditional princi-
1. 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983). The Grahams claimed coverage under PEMCO's "all-
risk" homeowner's policy; the Campbells, co-appellants against PEMCO, made the same claim
under a "named peril" homeowner's policy. Both policies contained the same exclusionary lan-
guage. Exhibits 5 & 6, Superior Ct. Clerk's Papers ("CP"), Graham v. PEMCO, No. 49,408 (Cowl-
itz County Super. Ct. 1981), rev'd sub. nom. Graham v. PEMCO, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077
(1983); Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 15-17, Graham v. PEMCO, No. 49,408 (Cowlitz County
Super. Ct. 1981), rev'd, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983). The Fotheringills, whose case
against Pennsylvania General Insurance Co. (PGI) was consolidated on appeal with that of the Gra-
hams and Campbells, were covered under a homeowner's policy containing identical exclusionary
language. Complaint of plaintiffs at 1-2, Fotheringill v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. (PGI), No.
49,695 (Cowlitz County Super. Ct. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Graham v. PEMCO, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656
P.2d 1077 (1983).
2. The policies were issued under the Homeowners 76 Policy Program, which replaced tradi-
tional legal language of older forms with significantly more readable language. Exhibits C & D (John
Liner Letter), Graham v. PEMCO, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983). The Homeowners 76
Policy, used in roughly half of the states, was drafted by the National Insurance Services Office and
approved for use in Washington in 1977. Id.; R. Johnson & J. Jarvis, The Insurance Industry Re-
sponse in Natural Disasters: Selected Problems & Implications 3-20 (1980) (available from Continu-
ing Legal Education Comm., Wash. St. B. Ass'n) (contains reports by the Washington State Insur-
ance Commissioner's Office following the eruption, including discussion of interpretation problems
raised by simplified language). See generally Ciaramitaro, Plain English in Insurance Contracts, 62
MICH. B.J. 961 (1983).
3. The term "all-risk" is an insurance term of art. "All-risk" does not mean that all risks are
covered; only risks not expressly excluded are covered. R. KErON. BASIC INSURANCE LAW 270-72
(1960). The term encompasses miscellaneous risks in addition to the traditionally insured ones of fire,
explosion, theft, and glass breakage.
4. Graham v. PEMCO, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 535, 656 P.2d 1077, 1079 (1983). The court made no
further comment on the term "earth movement" even though the meaning of the term had been the
primary issue below. The court could have interpreted the term according to its ordinary meaning as
movement of "earth," that is, soil of any kind, including gravel, clay, loam, as distinct from rock.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 457 (5th ed. 1979); see. e.g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Curtsinger, 361
S.W.2d 762, 765 (Ky. 1962) (where homeowner was insured for "landslide" and the single word
"landslide" in the policy was in no way defined, court applied the ordinary, dictionary meaning of
the word as "the slipping down of a mass of earth"). The parties raised no issue of fact as to whether
mudflow was a movement of earth. Brief of Respondent (PEMCO) at 3-4,Graham, 98 Wn. 2d 533,
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pies of contract interpretation to resolve the dispute, the majority
introduced a proximate cause analysis. The court reversed the summary
judgment for the insurers and remanded the case. On remand, the jury
was to determine whether the Mount St. Helens eruption was an "explo-
sion" 5 within the policy terms, whether the earthquakes and harmonic
tremors preceding that "explosion" were "earth movement" (thereby
triggering an exception to the earth movement exclusion), and whether
the eruption proximately caused the loss. 6
The original unsimplified policy had resolved these rather strained
factual issues with seven illustrations of excluded "earth movement,"
including "volcanic eruption" and "mudflows." The insurers deleted
these illustrations, as the court observed, in an effort to simplify the pol-
icy language. 7 Consequently, the Graham decision appears to give sub-
656 P.2d 1077: Exhibit 4 at 3, Graham, No. 49,408 (Cowlitz County Super. Ct. 1981). rev'd, 98
Wn. 2d 533. 656 P.2d 1077.
5. The word "'explosion" is used in insurance provisions as ordinary people use the term. 5 J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3085 (1970). But see Respondent's (PEMCO) Motion
for Reconsideration at 4, Graham, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (claiming "explosion" to be an
insurance term of art). Where the policy furnishes no guide, its ordinary meaning prevails. 5 J. AP-
PtIEMAN, supra, § 3085. However, the term "explosion" customarily refers to accidental rather than
natural explosions. Id. The term has not ordinarily been understood to encompass volcanic eruption.
although the court did not acknowledge this. The explosion exception to the earth movement exclu-
sion is. in fact. a historical reflex. Insurance companies have traditionally paid for accidental explo-
sion damage (although it could be expressly excluded), fire loss, or glass breakage regardless of the
cause. For the original policy to make sense, the term "explosion" must refer to something other
than a volcanic eruption: "This policy does not insure against loss . . . caused by . . . volcanic
eruption ... unless loss by fire, explosion or breakage of glass ... ensues .... 98 Wn. 2d at 535.
656 P.2d at 1079.
The supreme court did not consider the insurance industry's meaning for the term "explosion." a
meaning which in any event was unknown to the insureds. Affidavit of Fotheringill in Opposition to
Summary Judgment. Fotheringill v. PGI, No. 49,695 (Cowlitz County Super. Ct. 1981), ret"d sub.
noin. Graham v. PEMCO. 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983); Affidavit of Graham & Campbell
in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Graham. No. 49,408 (Cowlitz County Super. Ct.
1981). rer'dsub. nuom. Graham v. PEMCO, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983): Brief of Appel-
lants at I1- 12. Graham, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983). Because the new policy did not offer
the contextual evidence found above in the original, the court did not have to account for that evi-
dence. The question of whether an original policy can be used as extrinsic evidence of the meaning of
its plain English successor is as yet unanswered.
The Graham court avoided this issue of extrinsic evidence, following without comment the Wash-
ington cases in which the meaning of "explosion" was found to be a matter of common experience.
E.g.. Oroville Cordell Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Minneapolis Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 68 Wn. 2d 117.
122, 125.411 P.2d 873, 876-77, 878 (1966), app., 72 Wn. 2d 544,434 P.2d 3 (1967) (meaning of
"explosion" in insurance policy must be construed in its popular senses, by ordinary people).
6. Graham v. PEMCO, 98 Wn. 2d at 539, 656 P.2d at 1081.
7. Id. at 535, 656 P.2d at 1079. The plain English policy was meant to exclude all types of earth
movement, including the seven types described in the original form. Exhibit D (John Liner Letter).
supra note 2: Brief of Respondent PEMCO, supra note 4. at 7-8: Supplemental Affidavit of Patricia
Colp Kelsey at 2-3, Grahan v. PEMCO, No. 49,408 (Cowlitz County Super. Ct. 1981) (new policy
form constituted "no change in intent"), rev'd sub. nuom. Graham v. PEICO, 98 Wn. 2d 533. 656
P.2d 1077: see also R. Johnson & J. Jarvis, supra note 2, at 3-23, 3-24.
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stance to the caveat familiar to plain English advocates: if legal boiler-
plate is removed, a court may find an instrument ambiguous and thus
subject to reconstruction. 8
Although the result in Graham discourages plain English form draft-
ing, the case's significance extends beyond questions of policy language
simplification. Graham illustrates the cost of just results reached for the
wrong reasons. Graham should have been a simple decision. Explosion
was a covered peril under the all-risk policy. The eruption could reason-
ably have been viewed as an explosion, both in terms of the common
meaning of the word "explosion" and of the policy itself. The eruption
was the dominant cause of the loss: if the eruption had not occurred, the
homes would not have been destroyed. Thus, an insured-against peril was
the dominant cause of the insured's loss. Instead of this straightforward
solution to the case, the majority chose a technical solution that required
the overturning of thirty-three years of previous Washington case law.
The majority's technical solution-based on proximate cause reason-
ing-has consequences more costly than a reversal of precedent and the
unnecessary complication of one insurance decision. In the wake of the
eruption and the Graham litigation, the technical content of plain English
form policies in Washington has been increased in an effort to limit cov-
erage. 9 The new proximate cause test has thrust on Washington attorneys
the difficult task of second-guessing the court as to where on the chain of
causation it will stop its analysis. Agents and insureds are no longer able
to settle their own disputes because neither of them can determine proxi-
mate cause. The public, the insurance industry, the courts, and conscien-
tious attorneys are all harmed by the resulting increase in claims litiga-
tion. A study of the unusual context and elaborate reasoning of Graham
reveals how this potentially simple case made bad law.
This Note first analyzes the majority's introduction of a tort concept of
proximate cause for deciding insurance cases-and for covertly making
public policy. 10 Second, the Note analyzes the dissent's failure to modify
8. Counsel for PEMCO, Douglas Houser, raised this issue at trial, describing the case to the
court as a "good philosophical test" of simplification. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, supra note
I, at 42-43. See generally Woodyard, Readable Policies . . . Advanced Calculus vs. Truck Stop
Lust?, II BRIEF. Nov. 1981, at 33-35 (one of the great concerns about the conversion to readable
policies is the likelihood of increased risk; model enactments for policy simplification are designed to
avoid increasing the risks assumed under the redrafted policies).
9. Seeinfranote8l.
10. The practice of policy-making under the rubric of proximate cause is well documented in
California insurance decisions. See, e.g., Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 689 (1963); Premier Ins. Co. v. Welch, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983); State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Kohl, 131 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 182 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1982); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973). See
generally Voght, Tests of Causation and the Florida Jury Instructions-The Current Conflict and the
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its traditional contract analysis to meet the needs of consumers who pur-
chase standard form contracts. The Note recommends the use of an adhe-
sion contract analysis and a common sense test of causation for deciding
consumer insurance cases. The Note considers the insurance industry's
dilemma as it attempts to respond to plain language legislation while still
controlling its exposure to liability. The Note considers as well the public
interest in fair and comprehensible insurance policies.
1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Grahams purchased PEMCO's most comprehensive all-risk home-
owner's insurance policy. 1 As with most insurance transactions, 12 the
terms of the deal were packaged-they were not negotiated, nor were
they negotiable. No agent explained the form to them or specifically ex-
plained the exclusions from their "all-risk" coverage. 13 They began pay-
ing premiums before they received their printed policy in the mail. Sev-
eral years later, they received a second, plain English policy without
notice of any substantive change. The Grahams did not read either the
original or the simplified policy until after their home was destroyed. 14
Although they were unaware of it, the Grahams' all-risk coverage
under both their original and the simplified policy was limited by a broad
exclusion for losses caused by "earth movement." The plain English pol-
icy contained the following exclusions for earth movement and water
damage:
SECTION I-EXCLUSIONS.
We do not cover loss resulting directly or indirectly from:
2. Earth Movement. Direct loss by fire, explosion, theft, or breakage of
glass or safety glazing materials resulting from earth movement is covered.
3. Water damage, meaning:
a. flood ..... 15
Need for a Change, 32 U. FLA L. REV. 308, 310-11 (1980) (fact and policy are tangled in the realm
of proximate cause).
I1. Exhibit 5, (Grahams' Homeowners Policy), supra note 1. Telephone interview with John
Barlow, Counsel for the Grahams and the Campbells (Aug. 24, 1983) (notes on file with the Wash-
ington Law Review). PEMCO has never offered coverage for volcanic eruption. Interrogatories to
Defendant and Answers at 6, Graham v. PEMCO, No. 49,408 (Cowlitz County Super. Ct. 1981),
rev'dsub. nom. Graham v. PEMCO, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983).
12. R. KEETON. supra note 3, at 60.
13. Telephone interview with John Barlow, supra note 11. They had not given thought to a
possible eruption. However, they did not believe that they had earthquake coverage. Id.
14. Id.
15. 98 Wn. 2d at 535, 656 P.2d at 1079.
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The original policy contained the same exclusion in longer and less
readable form:
This policy does not insure against loss:
2. caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by any earth
movement, including but not limited to earthquake, volcanic eruption,
landslide, mudflow, earth sinking, rising or shifting; unless loss by fire, ex-
plosion or breakage of glass constituting a part of the building(s) covered
hereunder, including glass in storm doors and storm windows, ensues, and
this Company shall then be liable only for such ensuing loss, but this exclu-
sion does not apply to loss by theft; .... 16
The plain English policy was in effect on May 18, 1980, when Mount
St. Helens erupted. The eruption melted snow, ice, and glacial blocks
which then combined with hot ash, debris, and torrential rains from the
eruption cloud to flood the nearby Toutle River valley with mud and wa-
ter. Approximately ten hours after the eruption began, a mudflow,.com-
bined with or preceded by flooding, stripped 150 square miles of the Tou-
tle River Basin of timber and all structures, 17 including the Grahams'
home. 18
The Grahams filed a claim with their insurer, PEMCO, who rejected it
on the basis of the earth movement exclusion. The Grahams, joined by
the Campbells, then brought suit against PEMCO. The Fotheringills
brought a parallel suit against Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. After hearing
nearly identical arguments, the superior court granted summary judgment
for PEMCO and PGI. 19 The superior court found that the direct cause of
16. Id.
17. R. Leed, Environmental Considerations Resulting from the Mount St. Helens Eruptions in
Natural Disasters: Selected Problems and Implications 4-4 (1980) (available from Continuing Legal
Education Comm., Wash. St. B. Ass'n). Within four days of the eruption, the Washington Insurance
Commissioner met with the heads of insurance companies and strongly encouraged them to cover all
losses. R. Johnson & J. Jarvis, supra note 2, at 3-4. The Commissioner advised the insurance compa-
nies that the eruption was a covered "explosion" under the standard form. Id. at 3-5. But see discus-
sion of "explosion," supra note 5. Most insurance companies paid for damage caused by the volcano
regardless of the technical language in their forms. R. Johnson & J. Jarvis, supra note 2, at 3-5, 3-26;
telephone interview with J. Scott Jarvis, Public Defender, Office of Insurance Commissioner (Aug.
29, 1983) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review). A number of companies with "all-risk"
policies containing the old "volcanic eruption" exclusion waived it and paid claims. R. Johnson & J.
Jarvis, supra note 2, at 3-27. The total bill for damage to real property was relatively small-25-26
million. Telephone interview with J. Scott Jarvis, supra. Due to the extensive national publicity, the
public relations impact was relatively large. Thus, companies may have paid claims to avoid adverse
publicity and to match the generosity of competing companies rather than in direct response to the
Commissioner's analysis of the eruption as an insured-against peril.
18. The Graham's home was located 20 to 25 miles away from Mount St. Helens. Graham, 98
Wn. 2d at 534, 656 P.2d at 1079.
19. Id. at 535-36, 656 P.2d at 1079.
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damage to the plaintiffs' homes was a combination of mudflow and flood
and that the policies contained specific exclusions for damage by earth
movement or flood. 20 On direct appeal from the summary judgment, the
supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that whether an insured-
against peril caused the losses was a question of fact for the jury. 2'
II. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
Although the appellants brought their complaint as breach of contract,
the majority answered in terms of the tort concept of proximate cause. 22
The court reasoned that (1) if the eruption of Mount St. Helens were
found to be an "explosion," 23 (2) if that explosion were caused by pre-
liminary earth movement (tremors and preliminary earthquakes), and (3)
if the Grahams' loss were due directly to Mount St. Helens' eruption,
then their loss would be covered by the policy as "direct loss from an
explosion resulting from earth movement.' '24 The majority opinion fo-
20. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, supra note I, at 54-55. The court found that a mudflow is
"'the movement of earth together with the movement of water." Id. at 55. However, the trial court
expressed "a very strong hunch that when they [the supreme court] get this case before them they're
going to find that they don't agree with what they said [in Bruener v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 37 Wn.
2d 181, 222 P.2d 833 (1950)]." Id. at 52. The court stated twice that it did not necessarily agree with
the result Bruener required it to reach. Id. at 52, 54. For discussion of Bruener (the controlling prior
case), see infra note 25.
21. 98 Wn. 2d at 536, 656 P.2d at 1079-80. Both PEMCO and PGI settled with their insureds
before retrial. The cases were dismissed in Cowlitz County Superior Court on Oct. 5, 1983. Graham
v. PEMCO, No. 49,408 (Cowlitz County Super. Ct. 1981).
22. The Grahams sued PEMCO for breach of contract. Brief of Appellants, supra note 5, at 3. 5.
The majority began its opinion by noting that "earth movement" is undefined and that the meaning
of "explosion" is a factual issue for the jury.Graham. 98 Wn. 2d at 536, 656 P.2d at 1079-80. The
majority did not otherwise examine the terms of the written contract or the nature of the insurance
agreement.
23. Both the plaintiffs and the court apparently overlooked the primary fact that the insurance
contracts covered direct loss by "explosion" whether or not preceded by "earth movement." Thus,
plaintiffs were erroneously relieved of their burden to prove their loss by an "explosion" in the first
instance. Respondent PEMCO's Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 4-5; Brief of Appel-
lants, supra note 5. at 28 (assertion that loss was due to a covered "explosion" is not explained or
supported). See generally 5 J. APPLEMAN. supra note 5, § 3086 (Application of Explosion Provi-
sions). § 3085 (Provisions as to Loss Caused by Explosion). Thus, the reach of the earth movement
exclusion was a secondary, not a primary, question.
24. 98 Wn. 2d at 536. 656 P.2d at 1080; cf. Employers Casualty Co. v. Wainwright. 8 Colo.
App. 292, 473 P.2d 181 (1970), In Wainwright. where a covered peril combined with an excluded
peril, and the excluded peril was not an incident of the covered peril, the court limited liability to loss
caused by the covered peril.
In Graham. the covered peril was explosion and the excluded peril was earth movement. If the
earth movement preceding the explosion was not caused by the explosion (and no evidence or argu-
ment was presented to establish such a causal connection), then under the Wainwright reasoning the
insureds would recover that portion of the damages resulting from the explosion alone. No evidence
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cused on the third premise-whether the Grahams' loss was a direct result
of the eruption. In so doing, the court overturned the last direct cause rule
of Bruener v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 25 as "an anomaly, inconsistent
with the rule in the majority of other jurisdictions." 26 The court did not
summarize the authority in other states. That authority can best be charac-
terized as inconsistent, although a proximate cause rule is widely used
elsewhere.
In early automobile cases, the Washington court used proximate
cause, 27 which it later abandoned in Bruener. When Bruener was decided
in 1950, authority in other states was irreconcilable and results widely
divergent. 28 Although the result in Bruener has been criticized, the legal
theory was consistent with the general insurance principle that "[y]ou are
appears in the record of any damage caused by the explosion alone (other than by means of earth
movement after the eruption). Thus, under Wainwright, the Grahams would recover nothing unless
they could show damage caused by the force of the explosion itself, i.e., glass breakage due to the
concussion. PEMCO did pay claims for glass damage and direct damage caused by ash. Interrogato-
ries to Defendant and Answers, supra note 11, at 2, 4.
25. 37 Wn. 2d 181, 222 P.2d 833 (1950); Graham, 98 Wn. 2d at 537-39, 656 P.2d at 1080-81.
The Graham decision ended a 33-year banishment of a tort concept of proximate cause from insur-
ance law in Washington. Bruener substituted a last direct cause rule for the earlier proximate cause
rule of Ploe v. International Indem. Co., 128 Wash. 480, 223 P. 327 (1924). In Bruener, the plain-
tiff's automobile skidded on an icy road and struck an embankment. Plaintiff sued to recover from the
defendant insurance company for the amount of damage to the car. The comprehensive clause of the
policy excluded loss caused by collision of an automobile with another object. The court held that
collision with an embankment was within the exclusion and that the damage was caused by collision,
not skidding. Bruener, 37 Wn. 2d at 184-85,222 P.2d at 835.
The Bruener court acknowledged that the line of insurance cases applying the rules of proximate
cause was followed by the Washington court in Ploe. Id. at 184, 222 P.2d at 835. The court rea-
soned, however, that the tort concept of proximate cause was inappropriate for insurance cases be-
cause it served the single purpose of fixing culpability, with which insurance is not concerned. Id. at
183, 222 P.2d at 835.
[T]he tort rules of proximate cause reach back of both the injury and the physical cause to fix the
blame on those who created the situation in which the physical laws of nature operated ....
Insurance cases are not concerned with why the injury occurred or the question of culpability,
but only with the nature of the injury and how it happened.
Id. at 183-184, 222 P.2d at 835. The Bruener court thus applied the traditional distinction between
causation in tort and causation in contract law. See Bird v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 224
N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 88 (1918) (J. Cardozo's observation that in the law of torts there is a tendency
to go farther back in the search for causes than in the law of contracts, especially insurance contracts).
26. 98 Wn. 2d at 537-38, 656 P.2d at 1080 (footnote omitted). The court's single authority for
its "majority rule" is 18 G. COUCH, ON INSURANCE 2D (Rev. ed.) § 74:696 (1983). In theory, how-
ever, Bruener is consistent with general insurance principles. Bird v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 88 (1918). See generally W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS 244 (4th ed.
1971) (word "proximate" means nothing more than "near" or "immediate" with emphasis on
physical or mechanical closeness); 18 G. COUCH, supra, § 74:712 ("The words 'direct cause' are
synonymous in legal intendment with 'proximate cause.' ").
27. See supra note 25. See, e.g., Ploe v. International Indem. Co., 128 Wash. 480, 223 P. 327
(1924).
28. Annot., 23 A.L.R. 2d 385, 393 (1950).
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not to trouble yourself with distant causes." ' 29 Since the Bruener deci-
sion, courts in other jurisdictions have moved toward readings of exclu-
sions that are more generous to the insured, often by means of proximate
cause analysis. Perhaps due to the obscurity of proximate cause theory,
the decisions are not uniform in their approach. 30
The majority offered as its reason for adopting the proximate cause rule
that the "mechanical simplicity of the Bruener rule does not allow in-
quiry into the intent and expectations of the parties to the insurance con-
tract." 31 The majority did not, however, inquire into the intent and ex-
pectations of the parties. The court's definition of proximate cause
suggests that the court's purpose was to bring Washington case law in line
with its reading of proximate cause cases in other jurisdictions. 32
The court concluded that since the facts in Graham were capable of
supporting different inferences, the question of proximate cause was for
the jury. 33 Specifically, the court found that a jury could "determine
[that] the water displacement, melting snow and ice and mudflows were
mere manifestations of the eruption, finding that the eruption of Mount
St. Helens was the proximate cause of the damage to appellants'
homes.' '34 The majority opinion was thus focused exclusively on the tort
concept of proximate cause.
29. Bird v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 88 (1918).
30. Cresthill Indus. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 53 A.D.2d 488, 385 N.Y.S.2d 797. 799
(1976) (where an excluded peril and a covered peril combined to cause loss, court found no control-
ling New York precedent and absence of uniform authority in other states). The Cresthill court al-
lowed recovery where water damage, an excluded peril, had been caused by vandalism, a covered
peril. See also Hatley v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 261 Or. 606, 494 P.2d 426 (1972); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Coin-O-Mat, Inc., 202 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); General Accident Fire & Life Assur-
ance Corp. v. Azar, 103 Ga. App. 215, 119 S.E.2d 82 (1961); Lanza Enters., Inc. v. Continental
Ins. Co., 142 So. 2d 580 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 526
S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Parnell v. Rohrer Chevrolet Co., 95 N.J. Super. 471,231 A.2d 824
(1967). Contra Pacific Indem. Co. v. N.A., Inc., 120 Ga. App. 793, 172 S.E.2d 192 (1969) (where
losses from theft were excluded by policy language, no liability for vandalism of property caused by
such theft).
31. 98Wn.2dat538,656P.2datIo81.
32. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. The court described proximate cause as the "effi-
cient or predominant cause which sets into motion the chain of events producing the loss." 98 Wn.
2d at 538, 656 P.2d at 1081; 18 G. COUCH. supra note 26, § 74:709; accord Brandt v. Premier Ins.
Co., 260 Or. 392, 490 P.2d 984, 988 (1971) (proximate cause is the efficient cause, which, while not
necessarily last in time, "is of such an overpowering and irresistible nature that its course and pre-
dictable results cannot be materially affected by subsequent intervening acts or events"); Frontis v.
Milwaukee Ins. Co., 156 Conn. 492, 242 A.2d 749, 753 (1968) (proximate cause for insurance
purposes is "active efficient cause that sets in motion a train of events which brings about a result
without the intervention of any [independent force]").
33. 98Wn. 2d at 539,656 P.2d at 1081.
34. Id.
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B. The Dissent
The dissent is brief and undeveloped. After observing that the majority
strayed from the basic issues of the case, 35 the three dissenting justices
took the traditional contract approach to an insurance case-as a dispute
over private law made between two consenting parties,36 Under this ob-
jective approach, the policy was viewed as an embodiment of the parties'
intent. Thus the only questions to be asked were: What are the express
terms of the written contract? Are any terms ambiguous? If unambiguous,
would there be coverage? 37 If terms are ambiguous, of course, then the
contract is construed against the insurance company as the drafting agent,
within the bounds of the reasonable expectations of the insured. 38
The dissent viewed the court's initial task as one of identifying the con-
tract terms.39 The dissent found that the policy provided coverage for fire
and explosion and excluded coverage for earth movement. 40 The dissent
observed that the next step--to determine whether these policy terms
were ambiguous-was ignored by the majority. 41
The dissent criticized the majority for improperly applying the terms of
the policy to the chain of events. The majority concluded that the explo-
sion of Mount St. Helens, if preceded by earth movement, brought the
incident within the terms of the policy. The dissent pointed out that the
majority left out a necessary additional inquiry: should the earth move-
ment exclusion be applied a second time to exclude coverage from mud-
flows? 42 This presented a strictly legal issue to be resolved by considering
35. Id. at 540, 656 P.2d at 1081-82 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. In insurance law, the general principle of construing ambiguous language in an exclusion is
to construe it in favor of the insured. 12 G. CoucH, ON INSURANCE 2D (Rev. ed.) § 44A:3 (1981).
Ambiguous or doubtful language or terms must be given the strongest interpretation against the in-
surer which they will reasonably bear or the most advantageous interpretation to the insured. Courts
are not inclined to permit the insurer to take advantage of any ambiguity, especially when the plain-
tiff's cause is meritorious and the defense technical. 2 G. CoucH, ON INSURANCE 2D (Rev. ed.) §
15:74 (1984).
Although neither the dissent nor the majority answered the question of whether any of the provi-
sions are technically ambiguous (not merely "undefined"), the plain English earth movement excep-
tion is confusing. The first sentence excludes loss "resulting directly or indirectly from earth move-
ment." The second sentence provides coverage for loss by fire, explosion, theft, or breakage of glass
resulting from earth movement-that is, loss indirectly caused by earth movement. Thus, to the lay
reader, the broad exclusion in the first sentence appears to contradict the coverage for indirect loss in
the second.
39. 98 Wn. 2d at 540, 656 P.2d at 1082 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 541, 656 P.2d at 1082. The dissent did not consider the effect of exceptions to
exclusionary clauses under general insurance principles. When a policy exclusion itself contains an
exception clause, the effect of the latter is to restrict the sphere of operation of the exclusion. Thus the
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the earth movement exclusion a second time. According to the dissent,
the majority used proximate cause "to circumvent the clear terms of the
policy," stopping its inquiry at a point on the causation chain where cov-
erage would be provided. 43 The dissent objected to such a reversal of the
court's past practice. The court had previously refused to revise insurance
contracts even to serve abstract justice. 44 The dissent concluded that its
interpretation of the policy was "necessary to give effect to the expecta-
tions that the parties had at the time they contracted for insurance cover-
age. "45
III. CRITICISM OF THE GRAHAM DECISION
As Dean Green observed about proximate cause half a century ago,
"The deplorable expenditure and stupendous waste of judicial energy
which has been employed in converting this simple problem into an insol-
uble riddle beggars description." 46 More recently, proximate cause has
been reviled as "the joker in poker, wild in aces, straights, and
flushes,"-a card trick that judges do with the causation conundrum. 47
Proximate cause survives its critics in part because such legerdemain al-
lows the fact-finder to reach up the chain of causation to fasten liability
where it chooses.
exclusion is made inapplicable and recovery is allowed if the harm sustained is otherwise within the
coverage of the policy. 12 G. COUCH. supra note 38, at § 44A:5 (1983). In Graham. if the explosion
exception made the earth movement exclusion inapplicable, and the harm was not otherwise ex-
cluded, then there would be coverage. The exclusion would, in other words, be made inoperative and
so could not be "applied a second time." 98 Wn. 2d at 540, 656, P.2d at 1082 (Brachtenbach. J..
dissenting).
43. 98 Wn. 2d at 541, 656 P.2d at 1082 (Brachtenbach. J.. dissenting). The majority opinion
stops with earth tremors preceding the eruption in an effort to satisfy the exception to the earth move-
ment exclusion.
44. Id. The dissent refers to Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 50 Wn.
2d 443. 449, 313 P.2d 347. 350 (1957), where the court said that "neither abstract justice nor any
rule of construction can create a contract for the parties which they did not make for themselves."
See. e.g.. Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv.. Inc. 637 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1982) (where policy lan-
guage is unambiguous, court must enforce it according to its own terms); Monti v. Rockwood Ins.
Co., 303 Pa. Super. 473, 450 A.2d 24 (1982) (court should not rewrite policy terms where language
is plain).
45. 98 Wn. 2d at 541, 656 P.2d at 1082 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that
the Grahams had additional flood insurance and that their claim and recovery for "this damage dem-
onstrates that they at least viewed the primary cause of the damage as unrelated to the explosion." Id.
at 541 n.3, 656 P.2d at 1082 n.3. This non sequitur is not explained. Neither the Grahams' expecta-
tions at the time of purchase nor their view of the primary cause is evidenced by their recovery under
an additional insurance policy.
46. L. GREEN. RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 5 (1927); see also Prosser. The Minnesota Court
on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN L. REV. 19, 21 (1936).
47. Vinson. Proxinate Cause Fog Spreads. 69 A.B.A. J. 1042. 1042-43 (1983).
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To introduce a tort concept of proximate cause into Washington insur-
ance law, the Graham majority relied on a case characteristic of the pre-
sent national trend favoring proximate cause, Franklin Packaging Co. v.
California Union Insurance Company.48 Franklin involved the applica-
bility of a water damage exclusion in a fire policy insuring against direct
loss by vandalism. The court found the exclusion not to apply where van-
dals damaged a water-cooled air conditioner, thereby causing a water
leak. The water backed up in the company's warehouse after a sewer pipe
had been accidentally blocked by a plumbing contractor. The Franklin
court emphasized that recovery may be allowed "where the insured risk
itself set into operation a chain of causation in which the last step may
have been an excepted risk.' '49 Similarly, in Graham, the court found
that the chain of causation was not necessarily broken by the last step
(mudflow).50
Franklin differs significantly from Graham in three respects. First,
Franklin involved commercial insurance, presumably purchased at arm's
length by informed business people, while Graham involved consumer
insurance purchased by uninformed homeowners. Second, in Franklin
vandalism was an expressly insured-against peril, whereas in Graham a
volcanic eruption was not seriously contemplated by either insurer or in-
sured. 51 Third, two distinct causes- vandalism and accidental blockage
of the drain--combined to create the loss in Franklin, whereas the erup-
tion was the sole cause of mudflows and loss in Graham.
The Franklin proximate cause rule, which exemplifies the rule in a ma-
jority of states, assists the court where two (or more) concurrent, indepen-
dent causes-one insured against and one excluded--combine. For insur-
ance purposes, if either concurrent cause is insured against, there will be
coverage. 52 But the first question must always be whether any cause in
question is insured against. The Graham court overlooked that question
in its "ardour to explain the relationship of proximate cause to insurance
law. ' 53
Because the eruption was the sole independent cause of loss, the Gra-
48. 171 N.J. Super. 188, 408 A.2d448 (1979).
49. 408 A.2d at 449 (quoting 5 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 5, § 3083, at 309-11 (1970)).
50. 98 Wn. 2d at 539, 656 P.2d at 1081.
51. See infra note 82; see also Frontier Lanes v. Canadian Indem. Co., 26 Wn. App. 342, 346,
613 P.2d 166, 168-69 (1980) (the immediate physical cause of the loss must be a covered peril, and
the parties must reasonably have expected to be covered for the eventuality causing the loss when
they contracted for coverage). See infra note 87.
52. 18 G. CoucH. supra note 26, § 74:721.
53. Graham, 98 Wn. 2d at 539-40, 656 P.2d at 1081 (Brachtenbach, J. dissenting); see Respon-
dent PEMCO'S Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 5, at 4 ("the jury questions as posed by the
Court in its majority Opinion do not contemplate this relevant threshold inquiry").
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ham court did not need a proximate cause rule to enable it to select be-
tween two or more concurrent independent causes.
Nevertheless, Graham replaced the certainty of the Bruener rule with
the enigma of proximate cause. In contrast to the unpredictability of prox-
imate cause, the Bruener rule of last direct physical cause provided an
efficient, inexpensive, and comprehensible way of determining coverage
questions in property insurance cases. 54 The Bruener rule was particu-
larly well-suited for fixing liability under commercial insurance policies
where parties bargain for expressly limited coverage. In most cases, the
last direct physical cause can be easily determined by the insured and the
insurer, facilitating prompt disposition and payment of claims. A proxi-
mate cause rule, however, destroys this simple, comprehensive standard.
If the insurer and insured must reach up the chain of causation, they are
more likely to require the court's assistance to determine at which link to
stop. Where successive proximate causes are alternately covered and ex-
cluded under a policy, agents and insureds will be hard pressed to reach
an agreement or even an understanding of their options. As a result, in-
sureds would suffer long delays awaiting trial and large initial expenses in
litigation. Often the only asset the insured has to compensate for catas-
trophic property loss, especially loss of a business, is the insurance.
Thus, if the insurance money is not paid promptly, the loss may be ir-
remediable. Further harm to the insureds results from the insurance com-
panies' increased litigation costs, which are necessarily reflected in pre-
miums. 55 In summary, although the Bruener rule was better suited for
commercial insurance transactions than for consumer purchases, it fa-
vored neither the insurer nor the insured; it was equitable, easily under-
stood, swift, and relatively inexpensive, and it could be followed without
judicial assistance.56
Although none of the parties argued for proximate cause or for the
abandonment of the Bruener "last direct cause" rule, 57 the court em-
braced proximate cause to determine the scope of coverage. By so doing,
the majority unnecessarily complicated the central issue. Because explo-
54. The policy rationale of the last direct cause rule was clarified for the court in the Brief of
Respondent PGI, Graham v. PEMCO, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983). The following textual
discussion incorporates PGI's arguments.
55. PGI predicted that "[ulnder the proximate cause rule, liability under the policy would be
contested in court as frequently and as vigorously as fault is contested in automobile accident cases."
Id. at 4.
56. But see infra note 88.
57. Although the appellants argued for the overruling of Bruener in the alternative, the major
thrust of their argument was that they were entitled to recovery under Bruener. Brief of Appellants,
supra note 5, at 14-16, 28-29, 32, telephone interview with John Barlow, supra note 15 (appellants
did not argue orally for overturning of Bruener because they viewed the result of Bruener as correct
in spite of the reasoning).
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sion was a covered peril under the all-risk policy, once Mount St. Helens
was found to have "exploded" in the common meaning of the term,58
then the only remaining issue was whether to trace back from the loss to
the explosion or to the intermediate mudflow as the dominant cause. This
simplified reasoning clarifies the dissent's position as well: the dissent,
following Bruener, traced cause back only to the mudflow, which was
earth movement and, as such, an excluded peril.
In short, the majority should first have asked whether the volcanic
eruption was an explosion and thus effectively covered by the policy. The
second and last question would then have been whether to trace back to
the explosion or to the mudflow as the dominant cause of the loss.
The majority instead confused the issues by attempting to find coverage
for an "explosion" within the terms of the earth movement exclusion. To
do so, the court considered whether the eruption was an explosion caused
by earth movement. The court's elastic definition of proximate cause 59
and its assignment of proximate cause as a question of fact for the jury60
left the answer to this confusing inquiry uncertain. However, given the
nationwide sympathy for those who lost homes in the disaster, a jury was
extremely likely to find for the insureds, whether or not it understood
"proximate cause."
IV. THE SOLUTION: ADHESION CONTRACT ANALYSIS OF
CONSUMER INSURANCE POLICIES
Neither the majority's causation analysis nor the dissent's contract
analysis addressed the fundamental problem in this case: neither party
knowingly accepted the risk of loss from volcanic eruption. As with most
consumer insurance contracts, there was no "dickered deal" or "meeting
of minds." Because the insureds were not notified of exclusions and did
not receive printed policies before beginning to perform their payment
obligations, they did not consent to the exclusions to coverage. 61 What
should a court do with a "contract" founded on such vague expectations?
In the past, courts have customarily used failure of consideration, lack
58. See supra note 5 (discussion of "explosion").
59. Graham, 98 Wn. 2d at 538, 656 P.2d at 1080-81; see supra note 39 (quoting majority's
definition of proximate cause).
60. 98Wn. 2d at 539, 656 P.2d at 1081.
61. Nothing in the record reveals what the insureds' expectations were at the time that they con-
tracted for coverage. In their affidavits, the insureds expressed an expectation after the eruption that
their losses would be covered. Affidavit of Grahams and Campbells in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 5; Supplemental Affidavit of Tamara Graham in Opposition to Sum-
mary Judgment, Graham v. PEMCO, No. 49,408 (Cowlitz County Super. Ct. 1981), rev'd sub.
nom. Graham v. PEMCO, 98 Wn. 2d 533, 656 P.2d 1077 (1983).
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of mutual assent, or construction of ambiguous language to deal with con-
tract terms that they found offensive. 62 Such case-by-case justice, how-
ever, makes the law unreliable. Instead, the courts should recognize a
consumer insurance agreement for what it usually is: a contract of adhe-
sion. 63 The term "adhesion contract" is used in this Note to mean a
printed form contract used for numerous insureds who are unable to alter
its terms and whose bargaining position is inferior to that of the drafter.
To treat insureds as alert, informed parties, mindful of their self-interest
and able to defend it, is to ignore the reality of insurance transactions. 64
Exclusions in insurance contracts, which insurers apply unilaterally and
which insureds are often unaware of, give the clearest example of the
dangers inherent in adhesion contracts. 65
A contract of adhesion requires different standards for enforcement
than a contract bargained for at arm's length. 66 Some courts shift the bur-
den of proving a condition to recovery away from the plaintiff insured to
the defendant insurer in insurance cases by characterizing the condition as
a condition subsequent. 67 Other courts require the insurer to carry the bur-
62. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. CONTRAcTS 320 (1977); Patterson, The Deliver, of a Life.Insur-
ance Polic. 33HARV L. REV 198, 222 (1919) (describes judicial "flanking movements").
63. The term "adhesion contract" was introduced to American legal thought by Edwin W. Pat-
terson. Patterson, supra note 62, at 222; see also Bolgar, Tile Contract ofAdhesion: A Comparison of
Theory and Practice, 20 AM- J. COMP L. 53 (1972). Patterson introduced the term to refer to con-
tracts drawn up by the insurer to which the insured merely "adheres."
Courts have recently begun to treat contracts of adhesion or standard form contracts differently
than other contracts, especially regarding the duty to read. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 65.
at 336-47. See generally Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Rea-
sonable Expectations oftthe Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981) (analysis of theories of reformation.
of equitable estoppel, of the expectations principle, or risk-allocation, and of judicial cost-spreading);
Kessler. Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract. 43 COLUm L. REV
629 (1943) (whether unity of law of contract can be maintained in face of increasing use of contracts
of adhesion).
64. J. CALAM.ARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 62, at 346.
65. Note, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Con-
struction ofInsurance Contracts. 57 N.Y.U. L. REV 1175, 1177 (1982).
66. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 62, at 336-40. Courts increasingly require the party
seeking to enforce an adhesion contract to carry the burden of showing that its provisions were ex-
plained to the other and that there was a real and voluntary meeting of minds. See, e.g., Weaver v.
American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comments a, b, f (1975), recognizes the usefulness
of standard forms and the limited authority of agents to vary the forms; it suggests that a party should
not be bound by unknown terms beyond the range of reasonable expectation. See J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO. supra note 62, at 344-45. Several tests of reasonableness are offered: (1) Is the term bizarre
or oppressive? (2) Does a term eviscerate non-standard terms explicitly agreed to? (3) Does a term
eliminate the dominant purpose of the transaction? Id. at 345. See generall Murray, The Standard-
ized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV 735
(1982) (criticism of treatment of standardized forms and analysis of difficulties that the Reporter had
in dealing with the reality of unread, printed forms).
67. 12 G. COUCH. supra note 42. § 44A:3 (1981) ("The burden is upon the insurer to establish
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den of showing that the exclusionary provisions were explained to the
insured. 68 Still others have expressly adopted the doctrine of reasonable
expectations under which objectively reasonable expectations of insureds
are honored even though policy provisions would negate them. 69
The most important new standard is the court's modification of the duty
to read. Although courts and scholars frequently recognize that insureds
do not read their policies and that insurers do not expect them to, 70 this
reality is too often overlooked in judicial analysis. Adhesion contracts
should be enforced against an insured only if (1) the insured actually con-
sented to the contents of the policy and (2) the terms of the policy are fair.
If an insured consents only by a signature or by acceptance of a mailed
policy, then courts should consider whether the terms of the contract are
the applicability of an exception, and it is necessarily inoperative when the factual situation to which
it applies does not exist .... (footnotes omitted)); id. § 44A:10 ("The burden of proof is upon the
insurer to plead and prove that the loss sustained was within a policy exception .... "(footnote
omitted)). For example, the Graham court could have shifted the burden of proving the absence of
earth movement to the insurers as the only parties with knowledge of the exact meaning of the exclu-
sion. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 69, at 386-88; see, e.g., Sincoff v. Liberty Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., I 1 N.Y.2d 386, 183 N.E.2d 899 (1962) (rule that insurer must prove ambiguous terms is
particularly applicable where exclusion is involved).
68. See, e.g., Russell v. Bankers Life Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 405, 413, 120 Cal. Rptr. 627, 631
(1975) (insurer granting broad coverage assumes duty of defining for the insured exclusionary clauses
explicitly and clearly); Note, supra note 65, at 1199 (use of an exclusion by the insurer should be
considered an affirmative defense to a claim, and the customer's assent to such exclusion should be a
required evidentiary element of that defense).
69. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gilstrap, 141 Cal. App. 3d 524, 533, 190 Cal. Rptr. 425, 431
(1983) (where insured claimed liability coverage for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle under a
homeowner's insurance policy, court denied claim as unreasonable; the test is what a reasonable
person in the position of an insured would have understood the words to mean); Mount Vernon Fire
Ins. Co. v. Pied Piper Kiddy Rides Inc., 445 A.2d 949, 954 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (an insurance
contract should be read to accord with the reasonable expectation of the purchaser); Memphis Furni-
ture Mfg. Co. v. American Casualty Co., 480 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1972) (whether damage resulted
from insured-against risk depends on intention of parties as disclosed by whole policy); 5 J. APPLE-
MAN. supra note 5, § 3083 (court's guide is the reasonable expectation and purpose of ordinary busi-
nessman when making an ordinary business contract; it is his intention, expressed or fairly to be
inferred, that counts); Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275,
276-78 (1976). But see Kelso, Idaho and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations: A Springboard
for an Analysis of a New Approach to a Valuable But Often Misunderstood Doctrine, 47 INS. CotUNS.
J. 325 (1980) (Idaho retreats from doctrine of reasonable expectations; approach proposed is analo-
gous to courts' treatment of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment b (1981); Murray, supra note 66, at
739, 782; Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REv. 529, 540, 544, 562 (1971); Note, supra note 65, at 1180; Note, Insurance-Charging
the Insured with Notice of the Contents of the Policy, 30 TEX. L. REv. 634 (1952).
Paradoxically, the insured public may have better coverage under a highly technical policy than a
plain English one. The court may not impose a duty to read the technical policy. One unappreciated
consequence of plain English policies is that courts can more reasonably hold the insured to a duty to
read and understand such a policy, regardless of the general truth that people do not read their poli-
cies.
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so unexpected or unfair that enforcement should be withheld 7' and the
duty to read avoided. Courts should apply the same standards to plain
English policies. Where there is no true assent to support a contract of
adhesion, its legitimacy must rest on compliance with public interest, 72
not on an unrealistic presumption that the insured has comprehended and
consented to the terms of the policy.
The duty to read should neither be enforced without true assent to
terms, nor should it be entirely avoidable. 73 Rather, both insurer and in-
sured should act responsibly to create an enforceable contract. 74 The in-
surer should provide a comprehensible policy and inform its customers
expressly of the scope and limits of their coverage. The insureds should
be notified by their agents of their responsibility to read their policies and
should in some objective way acknowledge their understanding of the
major policy terms.
Insureds must be clearly informed of policy exclusions in order to have
an opportunity to obtain coverage elsewhere. Plain English drafting is not
enough, since many insureds do not read their policies regardless of their
form. 75 True assent should consist of (1) an understanding of the
exclusionary clauses in question and (2) an opportunity to decline or ac-
cept. 76
The insurer could offer meaningful choice and avoid charges of uncon-
scionability by giving the insured a checklist of major risks to be excluded
or covered with a sliding scale of coverage costs. Universal perils, such
as fire and landslide, as well as those specific to an area, such as freezing,
volcano, tornado, or hurricane, could be offered or specifically excluded.
If an insurer chose not to offer additional coverage for an additional pre-
mium, then the insured could either knowingly carry the risk himself or
shop elsewhere.
71. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO supra note 62, at 339-43, (discussion of Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
72. Slawson, supra note 70, at 566.
73. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 62, at 330-34. For a classic criticism of
the outdated duty to read rule, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
74. The alternative is for the legislature or an administrative agency to dictate standard forms. J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 62, at 347. While the "most obvious and economical place to
resolve such an issue would be at the state insurance commissioner's office," these offices may be
understaffed and too closely aligned with the industry itself. Note, Insurance-Judicial Construction:
The Final Stop for Interpretation of Exclusionary Provisions, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 793, 809 (1979-80).
Increased staffing and the introduction of consumer participants in policy approval could offset these
problems. Id.; see also Sheldon, Consumer Protection and Standard Contracts: The Swedish Experi-
ment in Administrative Control, 22 AM. J. COMP. LAW 17 (1974).
75. See supra notes 13-14, 70, and accompanying text.
76. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 62, at 346-47.
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The insured's knowledge, or reasonably imputed knowledge, of the
scope of coverage could be evidenced by the insured's initialing 77 of
exclusionary clauses, by records of conversations, or by written re-
sponses to checklists of optional coverage. 78 Absent specific knowledge
of an exclusion or other term, the insured should be covered according to
a court's or a jury's estimation of the public's general understanding of
coverage under the circumstances. 79 The jury should concern itself with
interpretation of policy language, such as "explosion" or "earth move-
ment," only if the insured assented to the terms of the policy. The policy
terms should be irrelevant to a coverage dispute if an insured cannot in
fairness be held to a duty to read or if an insured would not have under-
stood the policy if read.
V. ROLE OF THE PLAIN ENGLISH POLICY
If insurers must communicate the substance of their policy to their in-
sureds in order to rely on its terms, they will have to produce policy forms
that both their customers and their agents can readily understand. The
Graham decision discourages such simplification. Although Graham may
be an anomaly, limited to its particular facts, insurance companies and
attorneys cannot afford to ignore it. While twenty-seven states now re-
quire plain language in insurance policies, 80 this decision encourages
Washington insurance companies to use technical detail in their forms to
prevent the court from rewriting them in favor of insureds. 81 The simpli-
77. Note, supra note 65, at 1200.
78. Such checklists are commonly used in car rental forms to document a customer's decisions
about optional insurance.
79. Millers Casualty Ins. v. Briggs, 100 Wn. 2d 1, 8, 665 P.2d 891, 895 (1983) (unanimous
court stated that "[olur conclusion is also dictated by common sense and the consuming public's
general understanding of coverage under these circumstances"); see also Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisci-
otta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 810, 640 P.2d 764, 769, 180 Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (1982) (primary focus of
court's inquiry is reasonable expectations of insured at time he purchased coverage); Thompson v.
Grange Ins. Ass'n, 34 Wn. App. 151, 161, 660 P.2d 307, 313 (1983) (insurance policy will be given
fair, reasonable, and sensible construction such as would be given by average purchaser); cf. Whit-
lock v. Old American Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, 28 (1968) (court takes a "fair and
practical view of what must have been the intent of the parties" in entering into an insurance con-
tract); Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wn. App. 951, 957, 592 P.2d 688, 691 (1979) (court's review of cases
leads to conclusion that intent of parties is primary factor considered by the courts in construing
exemptive clauses).
80. American Council on Life Insurance statistic reported by Document Design Center, Ameri-
can Institutes for Research, SIMPLY STATED No. 38, Aug. 1983, at 4.
81. As of April 1984, 95% of the homeowners and dwelling fire policies offered in Washington
had been modified with regard to volcano coverage. Letter from J. Scott Jarvis to Lynn Squires (April
9, 1984) (on file with the Washington Law Review) (letter includes Washington Insurance Commis-
sioner's suggested Volcanic Eruption Endorsement, issued Dec. 30, 1980). The eruption alone did
not cause companies to submit new forms or amendatory filings. R. Johnson & J. Jarvis, supra note
Washington Law Review
fled form in Graham allowed the court to extend coverage beyond what
either the companies or their insureds had envisioned: full compensation
for a volcanic eruption. 82
Although a plain English policy may expose the insurer to unwanted
risks, as illustrated in Graham, such a policy probably forestalls many
claims. In most cases of loss or damage, an insured will accept a com-
pany's denial of coverage if the printed form contains a clear exclusion. If
the insureds in Graham had found language clearly denying coverage for
volcanic eruption, they might not have persisted, even though they had
not expressly agreed to such an exclusion. 83 Accordingly, claims would
be reduced.
One of the chief obstacles to an insured's understanding of insurance
forms is the use of unfamiliar causation language. 84 The legal distinction
between cause in fact and proximate cause is difficult even for lawyers to
master and not all of them succeed. Judges certainly have misunderstood
that difficult distinction. 85 How much less able is an insured, given a few
words of explanation in a policy, to comprehend the extent of his cover-
age under a proximate cause theory?
A plain English policy for consumers should incorporate a clear, non-
legal test for causation or simply use "cause" in its ordinary sense. Cau-
sation for those untrained in law is a matter of common sense. The in-
sured untroubled by proximate cause could predictably conclude'that, for
example, if an insured had not been drunk, he would not have driven
2, at 3-36; see also Note, supra note 73, at 793 ("[a]dverse judicial construction encourages policy
drafters to increase their use of technical policy language in an attempt to more clearly define the
rights and duties which are part of the insurance contract" (footnotes omitted)).
82. "Probably no one considered, in 1977, [when the plain language form was approved] that
there was likely to be one [volcanic eruption]." R. Johnson & J. Jarvis, supra note 2, at 3-23.
83. Ignorance of the policy is a defense few people would want to make. If, however, the policy
were unclear or might be read to provide coverage, regardless of what the insureds thought they were
covered for. then the insureds might litigate, with a good chance of recovery.
84. Policies should be drafted without the customary causation language, such as "direct
cause," "indirect cause," or "ensuing cause." Instead, everyday terms should be used to illustrate
exceptions, for example:
We exclude these risks from your coverage:
b. damage caused by earth movement, for example, earthquake, landslide, or volcanic erup-
tion:
c. damage caused by water, for example, flooding or tidal wave; ....
An insured or a juror would then have several illustrative events with which to compare the event
in question. Due to the inescapable imprecision of language and the multitude of possible causes, no
policy can be made "watertight" or entirely comprehensive. Rather, language should reflect the
common understanding of both insureds and jurors.
Regardless of the number of examples that might be included, lawyers will apply the rule of ejus-
den generis to expand or contract the list to suit a client's needs. Boilerplate evolves as a defense to
such ingenuity.
85. Voght, supra note 10, at 310.
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across the center line; 86 if an insured had cleaned its roof drains, the roof
would not have collapsed from accumulated water;87 or, in Graham, if
the volcano had not exploded, then homes would not have been de-
stroyed. 88 When assigning cause in this way, lay persons intuitively con-
sider more than physical facts. 89 Since no event has a single cause, a se-
lection must be made from convergent causes to explain any event. A
common sense view of causation will necessarily reflect a blending of fact
and value, of actuality and public policy. If the insured and the insurer
disagree about the common sense cause of a loss, then that question of
fact should be for the jury.
VI. CONCLUSION
The scope of consumer insurance coverage should be openly debated,
not veiled by causation theories or avoided by traditional contract analy-
86. In Cummings v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., 10 Wn. App. 220, 516 P.2d 1077 (1973),
the insured, driving northbound, collided with two southbound cars, was thrown from his car and
killed. A medical examiner at the accident scene determined that the insured had a blood alcohol
content of .2% by weight; expert testimony established that such a person would be incapable of
driving an automobile. The court, anxious to avoid an "illegal occupation" and intoxication exclu-
sion in the insured's policy, upheld the trial court's finding that cause was not proven because the
proximate cause could have been mechanical failure. Even if there had been mechanical failure (or
any evidence of it), a jury could have found that extreme drunkenness would prevent a driver from
reacting normally to it. The Cummings court, like the Graham majority, reached the right result for
the wrong reasons. The intoxication exclusion, now statutorily prohibited, was unconscionable. If the
court had used an adhesion contract analysis rather than its dubious proximate cause reasoning, it
could have reached the right result straightforwardly. See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text;
Bird v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 87 (1918) (Cardozo's argu-
ment for common-sense cause).
87. Frontier Lanes v. Canadian Indem. Co., 26 Wn. App. 342, 613 P.2d 166 (1980). An insured
was denied coverage under a vandalism policy when his roof collapsed from accumulated water. The
water accumulated because a downspout was plugged by cans thrown onto the roof. A common sense
perception of cause would be failure to clean the downspouts rather than vandalism. The court denied
coverage, but only after carefully examining "direct loss," "immediate physical cause," "efficient
proximate cause," "confluence of unlikely circumstances," and whether the cans had to have been
thrown with the intention of clogging the drains. Id. at 344-47, 613 P.2d 167-68.
88. These illustrate the "but for" test of causation, which is not merely mechanical, but reflects
evaluation of the appropriate cause. Contra Voght, supra note 10, at 313 n.42. Under a "but for"
test, the losses were clearly caused by the eruption; that is, they would not have occurred but for the
eruption. This test satisfies common sense in situations where the Bruener last direct cause test, supra
note 25, would lead to absurd results. For example, where a policy covers vandalism but excludes
flood, an insured should be compensated for loss caused by vandals who break water pipes resulting
in flooding of a business premises; although "flooding" is the last direct cause, the common sense
cause is vandalism. Under the "but for" analysis, the loss would not have occurred but for the
vandals.
89. Vinson, supra note 47, at 1044.
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sis. Proximate cause in particular is too ambiguous to serve as a measure-
ment of the scope of public protection. 90
An adhesion contract analysis would allow the court to address public
policy issues directly. The Washington courts should use a different set of
rules for a consumer transaction in which a standard insurance form is
used than for one in which the terms of the agreement are negotiated. 9 1
These rules would incorporate public expectations and actual purchasing
practices of insureds and insurers. Where the insurer cannot demonstrate
true assent by the insured or the basic fairness of a provision of the con-
tract, then the scope of coverage should be determined by common sense
and the consuming public's general understanding of coverage under
comparable circumstances. Where causation is at issue, a common sense
appraisal of everyday modes of thought and the ordinary use of language
should guide the inquiry.
Lynn B. Squires
90. Id. at 1043.
91. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 62, at 347 (the "ultimate result may be a radically
different set of rules for transactions in which all major aspects of the agreement are negotiated and
those in which standard forms are used").
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